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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OP THE STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE CITY,

:

Plaintiff/Respondent

:

v.

:

PAUL WOOLLEY

:

Defendant/Appellant

Case No. 920477-CA
Priority No. 2

:

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Rule
26(2)(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and Utah Code Ann.
S78-2a-3(2)(d).

STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The Statutes

and Constitutional Provisions are provided in

Addendum A:
U.S. Constitution Amendment V
U.S. Constitution Amendment XIV
Utah Constitution Article I, Section 7, Salt Lake City
Ordinance §11-08-020.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Were the statements made by plaintiff-respondent during

opening statements asking the jury to consider the role of the
government and what it means to the jury prejudicial amounting to
prosecutorial misconduct?
2.

Was there insufficient evidence to establish that the

defendant committed a battery?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Following a jury trial held on June 22, 1992, a four person
jury convicted appellant of Battery, a Class B misdemeanor.
Appellant was sentenced the same day to serve six months in the Salt
Lake County Jail, forthwith, with credit for time served previously
related to this offense.

This appeal arises out of that judgment

and conviction.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
A jury trial was held on June 22, 1992. During open
statement the City Prosecutor informed the four person jury that she
represents the government.

At that point the prosecutor then asked

the jury to, "stop and think about what the government means to
you.

Particularly in a case like this."

T.3.

added that the government represents the jury.
objection was made by defense counsel.

The prosecutor then
At that point an

A side bar was requested and

after the side bar, the trial judge sustained the objection.

The

prosecutor continued her opening by stating that she represents Salt
Lake City and that she is alone at counsel table.
After Defense Counsel made her opening statement, the city
called three witnesses; Mr. Sammy Knighton, Mr. Albert Ortega, and
Miss Juanita Valdez.

Mr. Knighton was the first witness called.

He

stated that he was with the victim, Miss Valdez, they had exited a
UTA bus near Indiana and 1500 West.

Mr. Knighton testified that he

and Miss Valdez exited the bus and proceeded to walk home.

He had

noticed someone was behind them but could not say for sure who it
-2 -

was.

Mr. Knighton stated that once he and Miss Valdez reached the

driveway of her home, the defendant/appellant, Mr. Woolley,
approached from behind and without provocation knocked Miss Valdez
to the ground and hit her on the

left side of the face. T.7-8.

Mr. Knighton further testified that Miss Valdez was walking on his
left side and was to his left when she was struck from behind.
T.12.
Mr. Ortega was then called as the City's second witness.
He testified that he was inside his home when the incident occurred,
and that Mr. Knighton came running in the house saying someone had
just hit Miss Valdez.

Mr. Ortega stated he ran outside and saw an

individual leaving the yard about 50 feet away.

He confronted this

person, but this person looked at him with a mean and blank
expression.

T.15.

At that point, Mr. Ortega told Mr. Knighton to

call the police, and the person left.

T.16.

Mr. Ortega then

proceeded to go to work and saw this individual heading toward a
yellow house.

He stopped and the individual yelled out that he was

calling the police.

T.16-17.

Mr. Ortega waited for the police and

told them how Mr. Woolley battered Miss Valdez. T.17.

Mr. Ortega

also informed the police that Miss Valdez was struck on the left
side of the face. T.17-18.
Miss Valdez was then called to the stand.

She related to

the jury how she exited the UTA bus and was suddenly struck by Mr.
Woolley on the right side of her face.

T.20-22.

She also indicated

to the jury that she was on the left side of Mr. Knighton when this
occurred.

T.22.

All three witnesses positively identified Mr.
-3 -

Woolley as the person who struck Miss Valdez at the scene of the
incident and also identified Mr. Woolley at trial.1
Mr. Woolley took the stand in his own defense.

He related

that he had been on the same UTA bus with Miss Valdez and Mr.
Knighton.

T.23-34.

He stated that when the bus came to a stop,

Miss Valdez and Mr. Knighton were slow to exit and slow walking down
the street.

T.24.

Mr. Woolley indicated to the jury that he was

angry because he was late, but that he was angry at himself. T.24,
27.

Mr. Woolley testified that he walked around Miss Valdez and Mr.

Knighton and proceeded on his way.

T.24, 27. He then noticed two

men were following him as he walked away.
effort to get away.

He sped up his pace in an

The men followed him at which point Mr. Woolley

was frightened because his brother had been robbed in that area, so
he ran to a neighbor's house to call the police. T.24-25.
At the closed of the defense case, the prosecutor recalled
Mr. Knighton to the stand.

Mr. Knighton testified to the

inconsistencies between his and Miss Valdez1s testimony on which
side of the face Miss Valdez was hit.

T.29.

Mr. Knighton recanted

his testimony that Miss Valdez was on the left side of him but was
insistent that she was hit on the left side of her face.

T.29, 34.

Mr. Knighton further testified he may be confused on this issue but
was certain Mr. Woolley did strike Miss Valdez.
The case was submitted to the jury and the jury found Mr.
Woolley guilty of Battery.

1

The Honorable Michael L. Hutchings

It should be noted that both Miss Valdez and Mr.
Knighton are slightly handicapped with minor learning disabilities.
-4 -

sentenced

Mr. Woolley to 6 months in the Salt Lake County Jail

forthwith with credit for time already served.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The statements made by the city prosecutor during opening
statement asking the jury to consider the role of the government and
what it means to the jury was prejudicial and violated Mr. Woolley1s
right to a fair trial by an impartial jury.
The purpose of opening statements is to aprise the jury of
what counsel intends to prove in its case in chief.

The statements

made by the city prosecutor were entirely inappropriate and was a
deliberate attempt to bias the jury against Mr. wooley, thereby
violating his right to have a trial by an impartial jury.

The

statements were an attempt to sway the jury away from the
presumption of innocence and shifted the burden of proof on the
defense and were, in itself, insermountable prosecutorial
misconduct.

Furthermore, there was insufficient evidence to

establish that Mr. Woolley committed the crime of Battery when the
testimony given by the city's three witnesses was too inconsistent
as to which side of the face Miss Valdez was struck.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
STATEMENTS MADE BY THE CITY PROSECUTOR DURING OPENING
STATEMENTS ASKING THE JURY TO CONSIDER THE ROLE OF
GOVERNMENT AND WHAT IT MEANS TO THE JURY WAS
PREJUDICIAL AND AMOUNTS TO PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
The purpose of opening statement is to aprise the jury of
-5 -

what counsel intends to prove when presenting the case-in-chief.
State v. Williamsy 656 P.2d 450 (Utah 1982).

The primary purpose of

any opening statement is to provide familiarity and a general
overview for the jury about the case.
In the case at hand, the city prosecutor, in opening
statement, asked the jury to consider the role of the government and
what it meant to each juror.

Such a statement has no bearing on

providing a general overview to the jury and would have no effect
other than to prejudice the jury.

However, the sole question before

this Court is whether the remarks made by counsel were so
objectionable as to merit a reversal.
In State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483 (Utah 1984) the Utah Supreme
Court upheld a two prong standard set out in State v. Valdez, 513
P.2d 422 (Utah 1973).

The standard provides that to merit reversal,

the remarks must, (1) call to the attention of the jury, matters
which they would not be justified in considering in determining
their verdict and, (2) under the circumstances of the particular
case, influence the jury.

See, State v. Troy, 688 P.2d at 486.

State v. Emmett, 184 Utah Adv. Rep. 34, 35 (Utah 1992).
In applying step one, it is evident that the prosecutor was
calling attention to matters outside the evidence in referring to
the government and what the government means to the jury.

The role

of the government and what it means to the jury has no place for
consideration when a jury deliberates to reach a verdict.

The only

effect that such statements could have is to suggest to the jury
that they owe the City of Salt Lake, through its prosecutor, a
-6 -

special duty for what the city does for itfs residence, thereby
creating bias for the prosecutor and in the least shifting the
burden of proof to the defense.

Thus, it is apparent that step one

has been clearly met in that these comments provide no information
for the jury of what the prosecutor intended to prove in its
case-in-chief.
Step two requires that the comments probably influenced the
jury.

Step two is more difficult to answer and involves

consideration of the totality of all the circumstances in each
case.

In making such a consideration the Utah Supreme Court has

held that the evidence of defendant's guilt must be closely
scrutinized.

Troy at 486.

In State v. Troy, the Court held that in cases where the
proof of a defendant's guilt is not strong, the Court must closely
scrutinize the misconduct of the prosecutor.
If the circumstances of the jurors is based on their
weighing conflicting evidence or evidence susceptible
of different interpretations, there is a greater
likelihood that they will be improperly influenced
through remarks of counsel, ...in such cases, the
jurors may be searching for guidance in weighing and
interpreting the evidence. They may be especially
susceptible to influence, and a small degree of
influence may be sufficient to affect the verdict.
Id. See also State v. Emmett, 184 Utah Adv. Rep. at
35.
In the case before this Court, there was not compelling
proof of defendant's guilt.

The City's three witnesses were in

direct conflict with one another and the facts, as laid

out at

trial, were susceptible to different interpretations, making the
prosecutor's comments more likely to influence the jury. Mr.
-7 -

Knighton originally testified that Miss Valdez was walking next to
his left side and that she was struck on the left side of her face.
However, Miss Valdez insisted that she was struck on the right side
of the face while she was standing on Mr. Knighton's left side.

If

this is accurate, it would be virtually impossible to strike Miss
Valdez on the right side of the face, from behind, without hitting
Mr. Knighton.

This testimony is perplexing at best and in the

least, confused the jury, therefore, the likelihood that the
prosecutor's comments, although small in degree, may have
sufficiently influenced the jury in reaching their verdict.

Since

the evidence of the actual battery was in conflict, it is probable
that the jury was influenced by the prosecutor's opening
statements.

Even though the trial court attempted to correct the

error, the potential harm and the probability

of influence was too

great to correct and the damage to Mr. Woolley's trial was
complete.
This damage, done by the prosecutor's statements, violated
Mr. Woolley's right to a fair trial and to due process of law as
guaranteed by the United States and Utah Constitution.

U.S.

Constitution, amendments V and XIV, Utah Constitution, article 1, S
13.
The United States Constitution in amendments V and XIV as
well as article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution, provides
that each individual is entitled to the due process of law.

The

statements made by the prosecutor made it virtually impossible for
Mr. Woolley to receive due process of law during his trial.
-8 -

Accordingly, the case at hand meets the two prong test and the case
should be remanded for a new trial.

POINT II
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO CONS/ICT THE
DEFENDANT OF BATTERY.
It is well established that in order to reverse a jury's
conviction for insufficient evidence, the evidence, taken in light
most favorable to the jury's verdict , must be sufficiently
inconclusive or inherently improbably that reasonable minds must
have entertained reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the
crime.

State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 433, (Utah 1983).
In Petree, the Court concluded that once evidence is drawn

in the light most favorable to the verdict, it is the reviewing
court's obligation to "stretch evidentiary fabric as far as it will
go...But this does not mean the court can take a speculated leap
across a remaining gap in order to sustain a verdict."
See also State v. James, 819 P.2d 781 (Utah 1991).

Ij3. at 445.

In other words,

the evidence against the defendant must cover any gap between the
presumption of innocence and the proof of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.

See State v. Boone, 810 P.2d 930, 936 (Utah App. 1991).
The query now becomes whether the City presented sufficient

evidence from which a jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant committed a battery.

Defendant was convicted under

Salt Lake City ordinance §11.08.020 which provides:
A battery is any willful and unlawful use of force or
violence upon the person of another.

-9 -

In an effort to "marshal the evidence," appellant brings to
this Court the following facts.

The City Prosecutor called three

witnesses to present it's case-in-chief.

Mr. Knighton, who

testified he was next to the victim when the incident occurred,
stated that Miss Valdez, the victim, was walking on his left hand
side when the defendant approached from behind and struck her on the
left side of the face.

T.8, 12.

Mr. Ortega, the victim's stepbrother, also testified that
he confronted a man who he identified as the defendant, and asked
him why he had hit his sister on the left side of her face.

T.15,

18.
The victim, Miss Valdez, testified that she and Mr.
Knighton were walking home from the bus stop when the defendant came
up from behind on her left side and hit her on the right side of her
jaw.

T.21-22.
Appellant contends that this evidence was insufficient to

sustain a conviction.

The testimony given at trial by the three

witnesses was too inconsistent to constitute a conviction beyond a
reasonable doubt.

Appellant contends that due to the conflict with

the victim's testimony and the other two witnesses that she was
struck on the right side of the face rather than the left side, that
it would be unreasonable for a jury to conclude beyond a reasonable
doubt that Mr. Woolley committed a battery.

Since such

contradictory testimony existed at trial, there does exist a
substantial gap between the presumption of innocence and the proof
of guilt.

-10-

Viewing the evidence in light most favorable to the jury's
verdict, it is evident, by the contradictory statements, that the
evidence is inconclusive and inherently improbable to the degree
that no reasonable mind could have logically concluded that Mr.
Woolley committed the crime of battery.

Therefore, appellant moves

this court to reverse and remand these proceedings back to the lower
court.

CONCLUSION
For any and all of the foregoing reasons, appellant, Paul
Woolley, respectfully requests this Court to reverse his conviction
and remand this case for a new trial or dismissal.
DATED this

lj

day of December, 1992.
V^ n

«^*g

/l

/r\

tiflKAUt ^

CARLOS A. ESQUEDA^
Attorney for Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY

I, CARLOS A. ESQUEDA, hereby certify that I have caused
eight copies of the foregoing to be delivered to the Utah Court of
Appeals, 400 Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah
84102, and four copies to the Salt Lake City Prosecutor's Office,
451 South 200 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 this

O

day of

December, 1992

L^^P

^^
~-7--y,ft A «-., s*

CARLOS A. ESQUEDA

DELIVERED/MAILED this

day of December, 1992.
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ADDENDUM A

AMENDMENT V
£0j>{¥
f\{| 5T

[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning —
Due process of law and just compensation
clauses.]

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, rmless on a presentment
or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation.

Section
X. (Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal protection.]
2. (Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.]
£ (Disqualification to hold office.]
4. (Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the
Confederacy and claims not to be
paid.]
5. (Power to enforce amendment.]
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law —
Equal protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citi•rns of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
aiizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

U*»V k»»4. it*. I

St.!

Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.
1886

